Chapter XIX : THE NAVIES OF THE AIR

Less than three years ago the momentous and spectacular raceamong the Powers of Europe for the supremacy of the air began. At first the struggle was confined to two rivals--France andGermany--but as time progressed and the importance of aerialfleets was recognised, other nations, notably Great Britain,entered the field.

Germany obtained an advantage. Experiment and research weretaken up at a point which had been reached by French effort;further experiments and researches were carried out in Germancircles with secret and feverish haste, with the result thatwithin a short time a pronounced degree of efficiency accordingto German ideals had been attained. The degree of perfectionachieved was not regarded with mere academic interest; it markedthe parting of the ways: the point where scientific endeavour commanded practical appreciation by turning the success of thelaboratory and aerodrome into the channel of commercialmanufacture. In other words, systematic and wholesale productionwas undertaken upon an extensive scale. The component parts werestandardised and arrangements were completed with variousestablishments possessed of the most suitable machinery toperfect a programme for turning out aeronautical requirements ina steady, continuous stream from the moment the crisis developed.

The wisdom of completing these arrangements in anticipation isnow apparent. Upon the outbreak of hostilities many Germanestablishments devoted to the production of articles required inthe infinite ramifications of commerce found themselves deprivedof their markets, but there was no risk that their large plantswould be brought to a standstill: the Government ordered themanufacture of aeroplane parts and motors upon an extensivescale. In this manner not only were the industrialestablishments kept going, but their production of aeronauticalrequirements relieved those organisations devoted to themanufacture of armaments, so that the whole resources andfacilities of these could be concentrated upon the supply ofmunitions of war.

In France the air-fleet, although extensive upon the outbreak ofwar, was somewhat heterogeneous. Experiment was still beingpursued: no type had met with definite official recognition, theresult being that no arrangements had been completed for theproduction of one or more standard types upon an elaborate scalecomparable with that maintained by Germany. In fact some sixmonths after the outbreak of war there was an appreciable lack ofprecision on this point in French military. Many of the typeswhich had established their success were forbidden by militarydecree as mentioned in a previous chapter, while manufacturingarrangements were still somewhat chaotic.

Great Britain was still more backward in the new movement. Butthis state of affairs was in a measure due to the division of theFourth Arm among the two services. A well-organised Governmentmanufactory for the production of aeroplanes and other aircraftnecessities had been established, while the private manufacturershad completed preparations for wholesale production. But it wasnot until the Admiralty accepted responsibility for the aerialservice that work was essayed in grim earnest.

The allocation of the aerial responsibilities of Great Britain tothe Admiralty was a wise move. Experience has revealed theadvantages accruing from the perfection of homogeneous squadronsupon the water, that is to say groups of ships which arevirtually sister-craft of identical speed, armament, and so on,thus enabling the whole to act together as a complete effectiveunit. As this plan had proved so successful upon the water, theAdmiralty decided to apply it to the fleet designed for servicein the air above.

At the time this plan of campaign was definitely settled GreatBritain as an aerial power was a long way behind her mostfomidable rival, but strenuous efforts were made to reduce thehandicap, and within a short while the greater part of thisleeway had been made up. Upon the outbreak of war Great Britainundoubtedly was inferior to Germany in point of numbers ofaircraft, but the latter Power was completely outclassed inefficiency, and from the point of view of PERSONNEL. The Britishhad developed the waterplane as an essential auxiliary to navaloperations, and here was in advance of her rival, who hadpractically neglected this line of eeperiment and evolution,resting secure in the assurance of her advisers that the hugedirigibles would be adequate for all exigencies on the water.

Indeed, when war was declared, all the Powers were found more orless wanting so far as their aerial fleets were concerned. IfGermany's huge aerial navy had been in readiness for instant servicewhen she invaded Belgium, she would have overcome that littlecountry's resistance in a far shorter time and with much lesswaste of life. It was the Belgians who first brought home to thebelligerents the prominent part that aircraft were destined toplay in war, and the military possibilities of the aeroplane. True, the Belgians had a very small aerial navy, but it was put towork without delay and accomplished magnificent results,ascertaining the German positions and dispositions with unerringaccuracy and incredible ease, and thus enabling the commander ofthe Belgian Army to dispose his relatively tiny force to the bestadvantage, and to offer the most effective resistance.

Great Britain's aerial navy, while likewise some what small, wasalso ready for instant service. The British Expeditionary forcewas supported by a very efficient aerial fleet, the majority ofthe vessels forming which flew across the Channel at high speedto the British headquarters in France so as to be availabledirectly military preparations were begun, and the value of thissupport proved to be inestimable, since it speedily demoralisedthe numerically superior enemy.

France, like Germany, was somewhat dilatory, but this wasattributable rather to the time occupied in the mobilisation ofthe Fourth Arm than to lack of energy. There were a round 1,500aeroplanes ostensibly ready for service, in addition to some 26dirigibles. But the fleet was somewhat scattered, while many ofthe craft were not immediately available, being in the shops orin dock for repairs and overhaul. During the period ofmobilisation the so-called standing military force was augmentedby about 500 machines which were acquired from private owners. The aeroplane factories were also, overhauled and re-organised soas to be in a position to remedy the inevitable wastage, butthese organisation efforts were somewhat handicapped by theshortage of labour arising from the call to arms. France,moreover, imperilled her aerial strength by forbidding the use of558 machines which were ready for service.

Germany's aerial fleet was of similar proportions to that of herGallic neighbour, but curiously enough, and in strange contrast,there appeared to be a lack of readiness in this ramification ofthe Teuton war machine. The military establishment possessedabout 1,000 machines--active and reserve--of which it isestimated 700 were available for instant service. During theperiod of mobilisation a further 450 machines were added to thefleet, drawn for the most part from private owners. So far asthe dirigibles were concerned 14 Zeppelins were ready for duty,while others were under construction or undergoing overhaul andrepair. A few other types were also in commission or acquiredduring mobilisation, bringing the dirigible force to 40 machinesall told.

But the greatest surprise was probably offered by Russia. Verylittle was known concerning Russian activities in this particularfield, although it was stated that large orders for machines hadbeen placed with various foreign manufactories. Certainfactories also had been established within the Empire, althoughthe character of their work and its results and achievements wereconcealed from prying eyes. In Russia, however, an appreciablenumber of private aeroplanes were in operation, and these, ofcourse, were placed at the disposal of the authorities the momentthe crisis developed.

The British and French aeroplane manufacturers had been busy uponRussian orders for many months previous to the outbreak ofhostilities, while heavy shipments of component parts had beenmade, the assembling and completion of the machines being carriedout in the country. It is generally believed that upon theoutbreak of war Russia had a fleet of 800 aeroplanes in hand, ofwhich total 150 were contributed from private sources. Even thedirigible had not been overlooked, there being nearly 20 of thesecraft attached to the Russian Army, although for the most partthey are small vessels.

In comparison with the foregoing large aerial navies, that ofGreat Britain appeared to be puny. At the moment Great Britainpossesses about 500 machines, of which about 200 are waterplanes.In addition, according to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 15dirigibles should be in service. Private enterprise is supportedby the Government, which maintains a factory for the manufactureof these craft.

During the two years preceding the outbreak of war the variousPowers grew remarkably reticent concerning the composition andenlargement of their respective aerial fleets. No officialfigures were published. But at the same time it is a well-knownfact that during the year 1913 France augmented her flying forceby no fewer than 544 aeroplanes. Germany was no less energetic,the military acquisition in this branch, and during the self-sameyear, approaching 700 machines according to the semi-officialreports published in that country.

The arrangements concluded for the manufacture of additionalcraft during the war are equally remarkable. The principalfactory in Germany, (now devoting its energies to the productionof these craft, although in happier days its normal complement of4,000 men were responsible for the production of anothercommercial article) possesses facilities for turning out 30complete aeroplanes per week, according to the statement of itsmanaging director. But it is averred that this statement ispurposely misleading, inasmuch as during the first fortnight ofthe campaign it was producing over 50 aeroplanes per week. Itmust be remembered that Germany is responsible for the supply ofthe majority of such craft for the Austnan armies, that countrypurchasing these vessels in large numbers, because in the earlydays of the conflict it was notoriously weak in this arm. Sincethe declaration of war strenuous efforts have been made to remedythis state of affairs, particularly upon the unexpectedrevelation of Russia's aerial strength.

It is computed that upon the outbreak of war the various Powerswere in the position to show an aggregate of 4,980 aircraft ofall descriptions, both for active service and reserve. This is acolossal fleet, but it serves to convey in a graphic manner theimportance attached to the adrial vessel by the respectivebelligerents. So far as Germany is concerned she is sorely inneed of additional machines. Her fleet of the air has lost itsformidable character, owing to the fact that it has to be dividedbetween two frontiers, while she has been further weakened by theenormous lengths of the two battle-fronts.

Russia has been able to concentrate her aerial force, which hasproved of incalculable value to the Grand Duke Nicholas, who hasexpressed his appreciation of the services rendered by hisfliers. The French likewise have been favoured by Fortune inthis respect. Their aerial navy is likewise concentrated upona single frontier, although a pronounced proportion has beenreserved for service upon the Mediterranean sea-board forco-operation with the fleet. France suffers, however, to acertain degree from the length of her battle-line, which is over200 miles in length. The French aerial fleet has beenparticularly active in the Vosges and the Argonne, where thedifficult, mountainous, and densely wooded country has renderedother systems of observation of the enemy's movements a matter ofextreme difficulty. The Germans have laboured under a similarhandicap in this territory, and have likewise been compelled tocentre a considerable proportion of their aerial fleet upon thiscorner of the extended battlefield.

It is in this region that the greatest wastage has been manifest.I have been informed by one correspondent who is fighting in thissternly contested area, that at one time a daily loss of tenGerman machines was a fair average, while highwater mark wasreached, so far as his own observations and ability to gleaninformation were concerned by the loss of 19 machines during asingle day. The French wastage, while not so heavy upon theaverage, has been considerable at times.

The term wastage is somewhat misleading, if not erroneous. Itdoes not necessarily imply the total loss of a machine, such asits descent upon hostile territory, but includes damage tomachines, no matter how slight, landing within their own lines. In the difficult country of the Vosges many aeroplanes have cometo earth somewhat heavily, and have suffered such damage as torender them inoperative, compelling their removal from theeffective list until they have undergone complete overhaul orreconstruction. Upon occasions this wastage has been sopronounced that the French aviators, including some of theforemost fliers serving with the forces, have been without amachine and have been compelled to wait their turn.

I am informed that one day four machines, returning from areconnaissance in force, crashed successively to the ground, andeach had to be hauled away to the repair sheds, necessitatingwithdrawal from service for several days. Unfortunately theFrench, owing to their decision to rule out certain machines asunsuited to military service, have not yet perfected theirorganisation for making good this wastage, although latterly ithas been apprecably reduced by greater care among the aviators inhandling their vessels.

The fast vessels of the French aerial fleet have provedexceptionally valuable. With these craft speeds of 95 and 100miles or more per hour have been attained under favourableconditions, and pace has proved distinctly advantageous, inasmuchas it gives the French aviators a superiority of about 40 percent over the average German machine. It was the activity anddaring of the French fliers upon these high speed machines whichinduced the German airmen to change their tactics. Individualeffort and isolated raiding operations were abandoned in favourof what might be described as combined or squadron attack. Sixor eight machines advancing together towards the French linessomewhat nonplussed these fleet French mosquito craft, and toa certain degree nullified their superiority in pace. Speedwas discounted, for the simple reason that the enemy when somassed evinced a disposition to fight and to follow harassingtactics when one of the slowest French machines ventured intothe air.

It is interesting to observe that aerial operations, now thatthey are being conducted upon what may be termed methodical linesas distinct from corsair movements, are following the broadfundamental principles of naval tactics. Homogeneous squadrons,that is, squadrons composed of vessels of similar type and armament,put out and follow roughly the "single line ahead" formation.Upon sighting the enemy there is the manoeuvring for positionadvantage which must accrue to the speedier protagonist. Onethen, witnesses what might almost be described as an applicationof the process of capping the line or "crossing the 'T.'" Thistends to throw the slower squadron into confusion by bending itback upon itself, meanwhile exposing it to a demoralizing fire.

The analogy is not precisely correct but sufficiently so toindicate that aerial battles will be fought much upon the samelines, as engagements between vessels upon the water. If themanoeuvres accomplish nothing beyond breaking up and scatteringthe foe, the result is satisfactory in as much as in this eventit is possible to exert a driving tendency and to force him backupon the lines of the superior force, when the scattered vesselsmay be brought within the zone of spirited fire from the ground.

Attacks in force are more likely to prove successful thanindividual raiding tactics, as recent events upon the battlefieldof Europe have demonstrated more or less convincingly. An attackin force is likely to cause the defenders upon the ground beneathto lose their heads and to fire wildly and at random, with theresult that the airmen may achieve their object with but littledamage to themselves. This method of attacking in force wasessayed for the first time by the British aerial fleet, whichperhaps is not surprising, seeing that the machines are mannedand the operations supervised by officers who have excelled innaval training, and who are skilled in such movements.

No doubt this practice, combined with the daring of the Britishaviators, contributed very materially to the utter demoralisationof the German aerial forces, and was responsible for thathesitancy to attack a position in the vicinity of the Britishcraft which became so manifest in the course of a few weeks afterthe outbreak of hostilities.

One of the foremost military experts of the United States, whopassed some time in the fighting zone, expressed his opinion thatthe British aerial force is the most efficient among thebelligerents when considered as a unit, the French flier beingdescribed by the same authority as most effective when actingindividually, owing to personal intrepidity. As a scout theFrench aviator is probably unequalled, because he is quick toperceive and to collect the data required, and when provided witha fast machine is remarkably nimble and venturesome in the air. The British aviators, however, work as a whole, and in theparticular phases where such tactics are profitable haveestablished incontestable superiority. At first the Germanaerial force appeared to possess no settled system of operation.Individual effort was pronounced, but it lacked method. TheGermans have, however, profited from the lessons taught by theirantagonists, and now are emulating their tactics, but owing totheir imperfect training and knowledge the results they achieveappear to be negligible.

The dirigible still remains an unknown quantity in theseactivities, although strange to relate, in the early days of thewar, the work accomplished by the British craft, despite theircomparatively low speed and small dimensions, excelled in valuethat achieved by the warplanes. This was particularly noticeablein matters pertaining to reconnaissance, more especially atnight, when the British vessels often remained for hours togetherin the air, manoeuvring over the hostile lines, and gatheringinvaluable information as to the disposition and movementsof the opposing forces.

But it is probably in connection with naval operations that theBritish aerial fleet excels. The waterplanes have establishedtheir supremacy over the naval dirigible in a striking manner. British endeavour fostered the waterplane movement and hascarried it to a high degree of perfection. The waterplane is notprimarily designed to perform long flights, although such may becarried out if the exigencies demand. The practice of deputingcertain vessels to art as "parent ships" to a covey ofwaterplanes has proved as successful in practice, as in theory. Again, the arrangements for conveying these machines by suchmeans to a rendezvous, and there putting them into the water tocomplete a certain duty, have been triumphantly vindicated.At the time this idea was embraced it met with a certain degreeof hostile criticism: it was argued that the association of thetwo fighting, machines would tend towards confusion, and impairthe efficiency of both.

Practice has refuted this theory. The British aerial raids uponCuxhaven and other places would have been impossible, andprobably valueless as an effective move, but for the fact that itwas possible to release the machines from a certain point uponthe open sea, within easy reach of the cooperating navalsquadron. True, the latter was exposed to hostile attack fromsubmarines, but as results proved this was easy to repel. Theaircraft were enabled to return to their base, as represented bythe rendezvous, to be picked up, and to communicate theintelligence gained from their flight to the authorities in ashorter period of time than would have been possible under anyother circumstances, while the risk to the airmen wasproportionately reduced.

The fact that the belligerents have built up such huge aerialnavies conclusively proves that the military value of the FourthArm has been fully appreciated. From the results so far achievedthere is every indication that activity in this directionwill be increased rather than diminished.

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Chapter XIX : THE NAVIES OF THE AIR

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